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Abstract  
This paper seeks to revive feminist interest in jurisprudence. However, it does not do so 
by conducting a historical inquiry designed to restore forgotten female jurists or reveal 
women’s contributions to the jurisprudential tradition. Instead, it comprises an 
invitation to rethink the encounter of jurisprudence with feminism. To this end it 
considers what counts as feminist jurisprudence, situating the rise of legal scholarship 
that defines itself as such, and setting out the notion of positionality as the criterion to 
judge what else can be included under this label. Thereafter it discusses the distinctive 
strands of what I deem to be feminist jurisprudence, before concluding with a call for a 
feminist re-imagining of jurisprudence as an activity both theoretical and pragmatic, and 
also as one which might hold hitherto un-thought possibilities for a feminist analysis 
and critique of law. 
 
 
I. The invention of a tradition  
  
Knowledge is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular 
subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts (technai)…and kinds of 
knowledge or science (epistemai). 
Plato (1991) 
 
 
The concept of jurisprudence designates one such specific body of knowledge; the 
knowledge, that is, of law. More precisely, jurisprudence refers to the kind of 
knowledge that promises a deeper understanding of law; one which cares neither for 
doctrinal exegesis nor technical descriptions of legal rules, but, in embracing much 
broader horizons, engages with diverse conceptual inquiries into the ethical, political, 
philosophical and normative dimensions of legal study. Although somewhat lacking in 
clarity such a general description is accurate insofar as it conveys the principal 
characteristic that has been constitutive of the definition of jurisprudence throughout its 
history, namely that its concerns lie with the theoretical analysis and study of law and 
its institutions.
1
 
 
The history of jurisprudence has been long and venerable. Of Latin origin, the term 
itself is etymologically rooted in the words iuris (of law, of the right) and prudentia 
(wisdom, knowledge), a translation of the Greek word phronesis, which Aristotle (1994: 
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VI. v-xiii) considered to be one of the intellectual virtues.
2
 Though not the same as the 
virtue of wisdom, phronesis is itself a form of wisdom directed at distinguishing 
between good and bad in matters of conduct in life; not only of one’s own and others’ 
private conduct, but that in the polity as well. As part of the rational faculty, phronesis 
denotes excellence in deliberations concerned with practical affairs and is closely 
correlated with a person’s age and experience. As such it does not merely designate an 
exceptional ability to exercise thought carefully and a capacity to understand and 
correctly judge a particular state of affairs. The process of deliberation phronesis 
inaugurates should culminate in a decision and a pronouncement of what ought to be 
done, together with an exposition of the most suitable means of expediting this 
objective.  
 
What therefore distinguishes a judgement resulting from phronesis from one arrived at 
through wisdom alone is the close association of the former to ends that are to be 
attained by some form of action. So whilst one’s virtuous disposition functions to 
ensure the rightness of an end, it is phronesis which commands the correct means for 
achieving this end. Although in being so closely connected with action the virtue of 
phronesis was seen as indispensable to those entrusted with the responsibility for the 
legislative and judicial functions, for the ancient Greeks it remained firmly entrenched 
in the ethical domain (Aristotle 1994: VI.viii.3-4). 
 
It was with the writings of Cicero that prudentia migrated from the field of ethics to the 
‘science’ of law, and the term ‘jurisprudence’ was formulated to designate the special 
kind of prudence associated with law. For if law, as its name signified, was right reason 
commanding right conduct, and hence the measure of what is good and bad, just and 
unjust, then prudence belonged to law such that law was prudence in itself (Cicero 
2000: I.v.18, vi.19, xxii.58, 33). Yet it is not only its etymological birth that the concept 
of jurisprudence owes to Rome; its creation as a separate domain of knowledge is also 
of Roman heritage. During the latter years of the Republic a body of legal literature 
emerged comprised of interpretations, commentaries, responses and expert opinions 
covering important questions of law. Together these laid the foundations for a distinct 
tradition of the knowledge and study of law.
3
 There also appeared a new order of public 
personage, the Roman jurist, drawn from the elite classes, whose prudence in being 
associated with their own comprehensive knowledge and mastery of law’s ‘mysteries’, 
became practically indistinguishable from that of law.
4
 Yet for these men, who bound 
themselves to jurisprudence out of love rather than necessitude, law was not their sole 
pursuit. They were also actively immersed in public life, enjoying high status and 
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considerable authority in the roles of jurist, statesman and orator. Indeed, on account of 
the considerable dignity the jurisprudentes enjoyed, both as politically active citizens 
and as students and teachers of its law, the Roman citizenry could boast that they, unlike 
the Greeks, had entrusted the authority of their law to their most eminent men (Cicero 
1989: 1.198, 253). Seeing no contradiction between a life in the service of law and one 
in the service of the people, these jurisprudentes recognised no incompatibility between 
different branches of learning. Though accepted as a specialised form of knowledge, 
jurisprudence was also open to influences from other disciplines, in particular, from 
rhetoric, philosophy, politics and ethics. And even though during the Roman Empire, 
when jurists were primarily tasked with advising government officials and the Emperor 
in legal matters, and with jurisprudence taking a more technical turn, concerning itself 
with the project of systematisation, its study continued to preserve its intellectual 
openness.
5
 
 
Acclaimed as the most important legacy of Rome, its jurisprudence traversed European 
history and, through its systematisation in Justinian’s sixth century A.D. codification as 
the Corpus Juris Civilis, shaped the paths of law and legal knowledge across the 
centuries to follow. Throughout this journey it also preserved its receptiveness to other 
disciplines. Renamed ‘civil science’ or ‘civil wisdom’ in the newly founded temples of 
knowledge, the medieval universities, jurisprudence did not simply engage with 
technical questions of law and hermeneutical methods for discovering the true meaning 
of received legal texts. It variously pursued debates over the most appropriate rhetorical 
and dialectical devices for law, delved into philosophical and theological discussions on 
the nature of justice and equity, and explored political arguments about the essential 
components of constitutions. Neither did it neglect issues concerning its own identity; 
whether, for instance, it should best be seen as a branch of literature, and therefore as 
one of the arts, as a form of prudence governed by experience, or, as a rational and 
universal science (Kelley 1976: 274, 1990: 135). Associated with right reason, the ‘art 
of the good and the just’, with the knowledge of things divine and human, and the 
mastery of the distinction between justice and injustice, it dethroned philosophy as the 
queen of sciences to become itself the ‘true philosophy’ (Digest 1888: I.1; Kelley 1976: 
267; Justinian Institutes 1987: I.1). 
 
Jurisprudence finally entered the English language in the early seventeenth century.
6
 
Although gaining a near universal acceptance on the continent as true philosophy, upon 
arrival on English soil it dispensed with its links to Renaissance humanism and adopted 
a peculiar form. This is not to suggest English jurists of the time were ignorant of the 
continental legal methods and debates, or that there were no calls for the reception of 
the civil law as “…the most ancient and noble monument of the Roman’s prudence and 
policy” (Starkey, in Mayer 1989: 175).7 It was simply that these voices were quickly 
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muffled, lost reminders of a ‘history of failures’ marking an alternative path English 
jurisprudence might once have taken.
8
 Turning away from the continental models that 
would have borne comparative, historical and philosophical methods into the study of 
law, English jurisprudence identified itself with what Coke called the law’s ‘artificial 
reason’ as distinct from the natural reason belonging to ordinary people. None other 
than the pragmatic and disciplined way of reasoning required by the practice of 
common law, it was only to be revealed through complete immersion in the long, hard 
and detailed study of common law’s historical record, the living archive of its cases. For 
it was here, in the collective deliberations and knowledge of learned and experienced 
judges, that the reason of common law was perfected and exposed, and it was only from 
here that it could be fully understood.
9
 What was born in the seventeenth century and 
released into history as the ‘orthodox’ or ‘classical common law jurisprudence’ was an 
endemic discourse wherein the study of law was of its practice rather than its 
theorisation. Here was a discourse whose language, replete with manifold images and 
symbols celebrating a single, unitary legal tradition, would remain steadfastly bound to 
the idea of a quintessentially English law, and ultimately, to a jurisprudence as insular 
as the history common law claimed for itself.
10
 
 
Today questions about the Englishness of English law, though not entirely dispensed 
with, have been quietly set aside. Their marginalisation began with the rise of the 
‘grand’ jurisprudential projects of the nineteenth century, such as those pursued by the 
Historical, Marxist, Analytical, and Sociological Schools, and culminated with the 
triumph of the Positivistic School in its variant forms.
11
 The latter would come to 
dominate the jurisprudential scene down to the present day, remaining largely 
unchallenged prior to recent interrogations by what might loosely be described as 
critical and post-modern jurisprudence.
12
 Nurtured in the shadow of epistemological 
questions posed by Kantian philosophy and neo-Kantianism, as well as the new 
ontologies created by the social science disciplines founded in the nineteenth century, 
these Schools have come to seek unequivocal answers to the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of the 
development of law and its institutions. They explore the relationship of law to politics 
and confront the fundamental question of jurisprudence, what is law? Exploring the 
internal logic of law’s conceptions, its doctrines, forms of reasoning and its rules, as 
well as what the appropriate function of law is or should be, they also debate whether 
law should best be analysed as a self-contained system of norms or as a cultural and 
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social product of its times, and even consider whether, at a time of globalisation, a 
universal jurisprudence is either feasible or desirable.
13
  
 
Women have certainly not loomed large during the long and revered history of 
jurisprudence. In fact they barely have been present at all; apparently there having been 
no female jurists, female authors of jurisprudential manuals, or female founders of 
jurisprudential schools. It could be argued that this should only be expected given that 
until recently women were systematically excluded from law and from politics, and 
whilst not forbidden an education, across all strata of society theirs was a curriculum 
devoid of law and philosophy. Yet, let us not forget that despite the diverse forms of 
exclusion imposed upon them down the years, women nevertheless have made 
substantial contributions to many forms of intellectual endeavour. Neither should we 
ignore the many ‘miracles’ performed by modern feminist scholarship in unearthing a 
rich heritage of women’s participation in virtually every field of knowledge and the arts.  
 
Law, or to be more precise, the theoretical and philosophical questions of law with 
which jurisprudence has concerned itself, does not however seem to have benefitted 
from such excavations. It might be suggested that women have not been sufficiently 
interested in law or that their interest has been effectively blocked by the difficult, 
specialised, and obscure language of legal science. However, we know so very well that 
even at the height of women’s exclusion from English law, when the doctrine of 
coverture was in full force, women litigated and wrote lengthy critiques condemning the 
injustices they suffered at the hands of law. We should also be aware of the long 
tradition of women philosophers reaching right back to Hypatia; women who articulated 
their ideas in a language no less abstruse than that of law. So the question remains: if 
women have so ably authored treatises on the military arts, political theory, ethics and 
philosophy, topics which, like law, have been alien to their education, then why has 
there been such a dearth of contributions to legal theory and legal philosophy? 
 
It is certainly the case that the study of law has been a particularly male domain, and 
one extremely hostile to the idea of women being in any way involved in jurisprudence. 
Since its birth in ancient Rome, right down through to modernity, the teaching of 
jurisprudence has been grounded in what the ancient Greeks called mathesis, and the 
renaissance scholars ‘discipline’. This was essentially a hierarchical mode of learning 
wherein the master, through instructing his ‘disciples’, imparted the ‘true doctrine’ and 
thereby preserved the continuity and coherence of law’s intellectual transmission 
(Kelley 1997: 12-6). Evidence of this is to be found in accounts of the history of 
jurisprudence, comprised of a series of great masters and their students whose writings 
and teaching both marked and formed this tradition. Furthermore, this mode of 
accounting differs little from that we see today, as attested to by the way jurisprudence 
is still taught in our contemporary schools of law (Veitch et al. 2012: 2).  
 
Yet positing the practice of mathesis as sufficient reason for women’s absence from 
jurisprudence should perhaps also be dismissed on the grounds that the true history of 
its tradition might well have been otherwise. Although jurisprudence has been widely 
celebrated as Rome’s most important creation and legacy, it has also been its greatest 
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invention, with its fair share of myth makers standing alongside its masters. The juristic 
tradition deriving from republican Rome is just one such mythologem; the collective 
identity of the jurisprudentes being essentially a constructed image imposed 
retrospectively by jurists via a culture of citation designed to ascribe continuity, 
authority, and disciplinary status to their own enterprise (Harries 2006: 49-50). 
Similarly, the uniquely English tradition unfolded in the writings of Edward Coke (who 
was actually dubbed ‘the great mythmaker’) wherein it is portrayed as reaching back to 
times immemorial, was just such another invention (Hill 1997). We might therefore be 
tempted to conclude that women realised very early on that jurisprudence was an 
invention and therefore not worthy of their interest. But this would only ring with a hint 
of truth had not feminist writings throughout their history applied their exceptional 
wisdom and well-honed critical skills to deal with any imagined and invented 
knowledge claims about them. 
 
This lack of feminist interest in jurisprudence is not just a thing of the past. Modern 
feminist legal scholarship, which otherwise has left virtually no stone unturned, has also 
shied away from an explicit jurisprudential engagement with law. Some attempts to 
rectify this situation were made in the 1990s, but the enthusiasm was short-lived and has 
yet to be recovered. Herein lies the purpose of this paper; to revive feminist interest in 
jurisprudence. In attempting to do so, my intention is not to pursue a historical inquiry, 
one which seeks to restore forgotten female jurists or women’s contributions to the 
jurisprudential tradition. My intervention is not motivated by any wish to fill gaps in the 
history of jurisprudence’s by adding women.14 Rather, it comprises an invitation to 
rethink jurisprudence as an ‘invented’ tradition and suggest that a more fruitful feminist 
critique of law may arise from this encounter of jurisprudence and feminism, one I 
believe we were rather too quick to reject.  
 
To this end the remaining text is divided into three parts. The first part considers what 
counts as feminist jurisprudence for the purpose of this paper. It historically situates the 
rise of a body of legal scholarship self-defined as feminist jurisprudence, whilst also 
setting out the notion of positionality as the criterion to judge what else is to be included 
under the label of feminist jurisprudence. The second part discusses the distinctive 
strands of what I deem to be feminist jurisprudence; and, the third, by way of 
concluding, calls for a feminist re-imagining of jurisprudence as an activity both 
theoretical and pragmatic, which might hold hitherto un-thought possibilities for a 
feminist analysis and critique of law.  
 
 
II. Setting the scene 
 
…this article demonstrates the necessity of making a feminist evaluation of our 
jurisprudence and of taking a jurisprudential view of feminism.  
Scales (1980: 375) 
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The terms ‘feminism’ and ‘jurisprudence’ first came together at a conference organised 
by women from Harvard Law School in April 1978 in celebration of the 25
th
 
anniversary of another first, that of female graduates from its hallowed halls. The 
subject of one of the conference panels, entitled Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, was 
described as “a wildly philosophical exploration of the impact of feminism on the 
structures and principles that support the legal system” (Scales 1980: 375). And 
although, as Scales reports, the panellists concluded that perhaps there should best not 
be such a thing as a feminist jurisprudence, the term itself survived, thereafter appearing 
in the pages of the Indiana Law Journal, and subsequently making its way into the 
world of feminist legal scholarship (Scales 1980).
15
 By the mid-1980s it had become 
firmly established on both sides of the Atlantic, rooting itself in North America, the 
Antipodes and on the Continent of Europe.
16
 At the time feminist jurisprudence also 
attracted the attention of feminist scholars in British Universities, but here, despite 
being widely discussed, it failed to gather firm support in any great measure and was 
mostly viewed with a degree of scepticism reminiscent of the panel’s conclusions at its 
Harvard birthplace. 
 
Despite being described as having ‘come of age’ by the late 1980s, within feminist 
commentary a singular or precise definition of feminist jurisprudence is remarkably 
hard to find (Littleton 1987: 2). True, given its highly pervasive nature jurisprudence 
cannot easily be demarcated as a subject area. Yet, whereas within mainstream 
jurisprudence this difficulty often has been a topic for discussion and at times even the 
focus of fierce debate, feminist legal scholars, whether through insufficient interest or 
perhaps because of the size of the subject, have shied away from attempting a definition 
of a feminist version.
17
 Most usually the field has been regarded generically, as a 
theoretical engagement with law and its methods, and with little elaboration as to what 
exactly this might entail. Sometimes, accounts of a contextual history of the rise of 
feminist jurisprudence or presentations of the substantive arguments of its specific 
strands have functioned as a substitute for a definition, whilst references to the diversity 
of its subject matter are offered as an explanation for this absence (e.g. Cain 1990; 
Smart 1991). In itself this lack of definition constitutes an invitation for setting criteria 
as to what counts as feminist jurisprudence and designating dividing lines between its 
different strands. 
 
From its inception feminist jurisprudence was first and foremost a contemplation and 
affirmation of a theoretical and critical position towards law. At first glance this may 
seem as nothing particularly new or unusual, since women have a long tradition of 
critically engaging with law, one which stretches back way beyond arguably the highest 
profile instance; their nineteenth century campaigns for civil rights.
18
 Modern feminist 
legal scholarship, following the path our Victorian foremothers carved out within this 
tradition, continues to be deeply concerned with law’s impact upon women’s social 
reality. Feminist jurisprudence has however, differed markedly from all that had gone 
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before. It emerged as an entirely novel project, an ambitious and daring undertaking 
wherein feminist legal scholars directly questioned the nature of law, asking what it is 
and how it works, rather than what law does to women. In exhorting the originality of 
feminist jurisprudence I do not suggest that confronting legal rules seen to exclude, 
discriminate against, marginalise or disempower women, is not of significance. Rather, 
I wish to draw attention to the qualitatively different type of encounter that the rise of 
feminist jurisprudence, with its peculiar way of interrogating the institution of law, 
initiated. For within the discursive space thereby created, feminism neither takes it upon 
itself to ‘legislate’ rules that benefit women, nor provide avenues through which law’s 
liberal ‘promises’ might be fulfilled. Refusing to act in the name of law, it instead 
addresses the law as an equal, meeting it head-on; with ‘her’ thinking challenging law’s 
rationality, and juxtaposing a voice and a mind of ‘her’ own to that of law’s, to speak of 
law to law. 
Of course, emphasising the position of the legal scholar towards law as the means of 
circumscribing feminist jurisprudence might attract some objections on the grounds that 
all forms of feminist inquiry in law are, in effect, based upon some sort of positioning. 
After all, feminism praises itself as being situated knowledge (Haraway 1991; Hekman 
1992). However, I contend that what marks out feminist jurisprudence from other forms 
of feminist engagement with law is precisely its departure from the established, 
dominant conceptions of what a feminist position towards law is. I therefore identify the 
concept of positionality as the criterion for distinguishing what I consider to be feminist 
jurisprudence from other forms of legal scholarship. 
In feminist literature the concept of ‘positionality’ first emerged in the context of 
identity politics. Here one’s ‘position’, defined in reference to a complex of external 
conditions, which, as such, are prone to change, was regarded as key to better 
understanding one’s identity. Shifting the emphasis to the woman’s external situation in 
this way allowed the contextualisation of a network of important confounding variables, 
such as race, religion, sexuality or class, such that the identity of a ‘woman’ could be 
defined according to a constellation of parameters articulated in inherently mutable 
contexts, rather than as constituted by essential qualities, which thereby avoided the 
pitfalls created by ontological understandings of womanhood (Alcoff 1988: 433-4).  
Subsequently adopted in feminist debates around the production of knowledge, the 
concept of positionality was utilised primarily in one of two ways. It was wielded 
critically in respect to bodies of knowledge, which, ignoring their own situatedness, 
claimed to be universal, neutral and objective. This allowed feminist scholars to 
effectively challenge these bodies of knowledge for being, for instance, male, colonial 
or racist. And, it also was employed in attempts to develop normative blueprints, most 
specifically in relation to securing best practice in feminist empirical research, 
particularly that carried out in the field.
19
 Here, it was suggested that a researcher’s 
awareness of her own position and its function as part of the conditions of the 
production of knowledge could and should, through a greater understanding of the 
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power relationships involved, nurture a special sensitivity to those being researched. 
This double focus of positionality, initially associated with the question of female 
identity, the question of ‘who speaks’ and ‘from where’, and then subsequently linked 
to the question of feminist engagement with knowledge as one of reflexivity and self-
reflexivity, is central to my discussion of what comprises a jurisprudential engagement 
with law. 
Questions of position and identity, notably in the guise of ‘who speaks’, have not been 
alien to feminist legal scholarship’s concerns with, and investigations of, law. Indeed, 
locating the problem with law primarily within the dyad of ‘women and law’ rather than 
the legal institution alone has had a major influence on the manner in which notions of 
identity have come to be understood within the modern feminist legal discourse.
20
 Put 
simply, by placing the emphasis on ‘law in relation to women’ and targeting those legal 
norms blamed for oppressing them, the knowledge claims thereby raised do not directly 
address law’s prudence, its workings, or its power structure. This is because these 
claims are not epistemologically grounded upon an interaction between the 
scholarship’s own knowledge and wisdom, and that of law, but are mediated by claims 
about women’s social reality and the many ways it is negatively impacted by the legal 
rule. Here, in order to assert knowledge of the ills law causes women to suffer, the 
epistemological gravity of the question ‘who speaks’ is relegated beyond the domain of 
law, to the social. So what becomes of the utmost importance in this epistemological 
arrangement is not the identity of the legal scholar, but that of the ‘empirical woman-
knower’ articulating such ills - she to whom feminist legal scholarship must lend an ear 
so as to hear women’s grievances and confidently assert and present them to law. Is it 
She who is entitled to speak as an all-inclusive ‘We’, or should this ‘knower’ be the 
many women of feminism who can only report their own experience of law through 
speaking as a ‘we’ grounded in particularity and difference, whether this difference is 
based upon race, ethnicity, religion, class, sexual orientation or a combination thereof? 
 
Whatever the merits of different feminist approaches to the identity of the ‘empirical 
woman-knower’, they share an acknowledgement of positionality as a signifier of this 
identity and so treat it as epistemologically foundational. Yet, once these claims are 
translated into the language of law by the feminist scholar and are received in its 
interiority, the question of ‘who speaks’ becomes muted. It is as if, upon entering the 
realm of law, the identity of the legal scholar and her stance towards her object of 
inquiry ceases to be relevant or important. It effectively becomes conflated with that of 
the empirical woman ‘knower’, with the result by and large being that feminist legal 
scholarship neither sees the need to account for its own position and identity, nor 
reflects upon its very own attitude towards law as a body of knowledge and the way it 
engages with it. 
 
Perhaps this seeming indifference is justifiable insofar as it is not the feminist legal 
scholars who originally assert which rules are harmful to women. They endorse claims 
deriving from women’s everyday reality, explain to law ‘why’ and ‘how’ these rules 
harm women, and then adjudicate the case in order to identify and demand a solution. In 
effect, it is the social that validates their knowledge claims about women and law, and 
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their addressing the law. Standing as interlocutors of law, not in their own right, but as 
mediators between women and law, what is therefore of primary importance to this role 
is an account of how women and their claims are best submitted to law; an account that 
bears no reference to the particular identity of the feminist legal scholar or her 
positionality towards law as a body of knowledge. It is precisely this ascription of the 
role of the intermediary to the feminist legal scholar that gave rise to one of the most 
intense and painful debates to have taken place amongst feminist legal scholars over the 
past few decades; the central question being on whose behalf should the legal scholar 
stand before the law - whether she should represent an all-knowing Woman of 
Feminism capable of articulating a universal experience of law or represent women as 
equal or different to men, in terms of differences between women, as relational rather 
than autonomous subjects, or, as intersectional subjects.
21
 
 
This displacement of the identity of the legal scholar and her positioning towards law 
distinguishes the form of engagement with law I characterise as ‘women and law’ from 
what I call ‘feminist jurisprudence’; with accounts of identity and positionality lacking 
in the former and present in the latter. Although I borrow the concept of positionality as 
it emerges in the literature cited above, my own use is somewhat different. As do they, I 
employ it as a signifier of identity; though here the identity is that of the legal scholar. I 
too expect an account of positioning that denotes that of the scholar towards a particular 
body of knowledge and shows awareness of ‘how’ she engages with this knowledge. So 
just like they, I attach the requirement of self-reflexivity onto the criterion.  
 
Unlike they however, I do not see positionality as a resource for judging the nature, 
quality and argument of the jurisprudential claims produced from self-reflexive 
engagement with legal knowledge. My intention is neither to critically evaluate the 
virtues and potentials of feminist jurisprudence, nor expose or chastise it for its faults. 
Rather, I seek to set it apart from other forms of engagement with law, delineate distinct 
accounts of positionality within its interiority, and explore alternative paths for 
understanding the relationship between feminism and law. In this sense I argue that the 
presence of positionality defines feminist jurisprudence as situated knowledge, and 
maintain that feminist legal scholarship must make its position towards law known and 
visible, clearly accounting for its relationship with law - how it speaks, thinks of, or 
imagines it, and how its mode of addressing law is justified epistemologically. Hence I 
see positionality as amounting to more than simply holding a particular view of law, for 
example, that law is sexist, patriarchal, or gendered, and demonstrating how and why 
this is so. It must also present such offerings in a self-conscious manner, as if holding ‘a 
mirror to itself’ (Robertson 2002: 785). This means that a certain degree of reflexivity 
becomes a necessary condition of positionality; for it is through reflexivity that an 
awareness and assessment of the power relationships present in the encounter of 
feminist jurisprudence with law, and consequently, of the political nature of this 
encounter, can be achieved.  
 
Neither is my use of the trope of positionality exhausted in the choice of what is 
included in that which I term ‘feminist jurisprudence’. I also employ it as a criterion for 
distinguishing its different strands. Traditionally, such distinctions were made by 
                                                 
21
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assigning feminist analyses of law to formal divisions between wider theoretical 
frameworks, or through reference to the substance of their argument. In the first 
instance, in a manner similar to the separation of nineteenth century mainstream 
jurisprudence into ‘schools of thought’, branches of feminist jurisprudence are 
identified as, for example, Marxist, liberal, radical or, most recently, postmodern 
(Jaggar 1983). In the second, following similarities in their method and argument of 
inquiry, works are gathered under a label referencing a core constitutive element that 
lends it the name, such as: ‘the master theory/dominance approach’, ‘the jurisprudence 
of care’ or ‘social harm’ (Cain 1990; Smart 1991; Munro 2007).  
 
I myself follow neither the ‘way of Schools’ nor groupings according to core elements. 
The former, in setting theoretical similarities or differences as the primary criterion for 
ordering, I believe, contributes to the invention of traditions, since in an effort to fit 
arguments into pre-existing, well-established frameworks, unique specificities can be 
easily ignored, exaggerated, or lost. Similarly, the latter, by focusing on core shared 
features, almost inevitably causes other valuable details to be overlooked. In fact, I 
identify two distinct tropes of positionality, each with its own logic animating the way it 
addresses law. The first is that which identifies itself as ‘feminist jurisprudence’ and, 
utilising truth as the organising concept in its approach, positions itself towards law as if 
law were ‘an order of truth’. The second is of my own construction in that it neither 
entails a uniform approach to law nor would identify with the description of its 
engagement with law as a form of feminist jurisprudence. Here I have included different 
approaches that have all chosen to explore and position themselves towards law as a 
productive order. Distancing itself from notions of truth, this trope sees law more as 
involving some sort of performance. Permeated by a logic that prioritises notions of 
‘creativity’, it engages with law’s imaginings, whether found in law’s practice, language 
or thought, and, positioning itself towards law as an ‘imagic’ order, understands law as 
a techné. 
 
 
III. The anatomy of feminist jurisprudence 
a) Feminist jurisprudence and law as the logic of truth 
 
Black Feminists speak as women because we are women. 
Lorde (1984: 60) 
                                                               
I want a law that will let us be women. 
Ashe (1989: 383) 
 
 
From the outset this strain of feminist jurisprudence, often identified with radical and 
Marxist feminist theory of the 1980s, turned its attention first and foremost to the 
delimitation of its own locus standi and, in so doing, gave a definitive account of the 
identity of the ‘knower’ and a clear answer to the question of ‘who speaks’ whilst also 
reflecting upon its own positionality, its mode of engagement with law. This place was 
one defined by collectivity and thus one from which a clear ‘we’ could be articulated: a 
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‘we’ that possessed a shared, unambiguous perspective as to what law is and how ‘we’ 
should engage with it. It was also considered a profoundly political place, since it 
offered a standpoint from which the recognition of friend and foe was never in doubt.
22
  
 
Indeed, in no other feminist legal texts is the identity of the ‘enemy’ so transparent and 
that of ‘friend’, acknowledged with such clarity. True, direct references to the 
friend/enemy dichotomy per se are not explicit in these writings, with terms, such as 
sister, sisterhood, or simply ‘women’, being those employed. Yet these terms are 
closely akin to the notion of friend, denoting an all-inclusiveness based on sympathy 
and affinity; an acknowledgement of a commonality of being and purpose, along with a 
group belonging, which, by definition, was constituted through the exclusion of others. 
A place was thus defined from which the voice of feminism spoke to and of law as if 
finding itself planted in a foreign and hostile ‘country’, rather than sharing a free, 
neutral territory where detached statements about women, the law and men could 
readily be made. As such this feminist standpoint of enunciation was one of partiality 
and ‘self-interest’, with the voice of those speaking it caring nothing for the promotion 
and defence of the interests of all people, but only for their own, the concerns of women 
as a specific group (Scales 1980: 375; MacKinnon 1983: 638, 1989: 83).  
 
In choosing as its first jurisprudential act to reveal itself in an act of speaking, feminist 
jurisprudence also asserts itself as a direct converser of law, one communicating the 
uniqueness of the voice that speaks, the body that bears it, and the story this voice 
narrates. Acknowledging its organic relation with feminism it embarks upon an 
audacious jurisprudential inquiry into law’s prudence, setting at its heart the task of 
“seeing, describing and analysing the ‘harms’ of patriarchal law and legal systems…” 
(Wishik 1985: 66).
23
 More specifically, in accounting for its positionality, feminist 
jurisprudence openly admits that its voice, akin to that of feminism more generally, 
takes shape, form and strength from all those reciprocal voices of women conversing 
through ‘practices of consciousness-raising’; the sharing of their distinct, everyday, 
mundane, and extraordinary experiences. Here, amidst the acts of speaking and hearing, 
and through reflecting upon what initially seemed a conversation between friends 
seeking to make real sense of their lives, private utterances are transformed into political 
ones and a political ‘common language’, one capable of articulating the collective 
reality and truth of women’s lives, emerges (MacKinnon 1982: 535-7, 1983: 639, 1991: 
14; Cain 1990: 193-9; hooks 1991: 8).  
 
It is through speaking this ‘common language’ emanating from ‘the Woman’s body’ 
and vocalising ‘the Woman’s story’ that feminist jurisprudence addresses and 
challenges law.
24
 It offers a language replete with materiality and thought. For neither 
                                                 
22
 It is remarkable how, even if the presence of the Schmittean distinction friend/enemy does not occur in 
feminist writings per se, they may be seen as grounded upon Schmitt’s understanding of the political (see 
Schmitt 2007: 66-7). Although the understanding of ‘the political’ and politics of radical feminism 
explicitly derives primarily from Marx and Althusser, its rhetoric is close to a Schmittean understanding. 
See the discussion of these terms in MacKinnon (1989: 157-9). For a discussion of the concept of the 
political generally and specifically in Schmitt, see Marchart (2007: 35-55).   
23
 On the close relationship between feminist theory and feminist jurisprudence epistemologically and 
otherwise, see Wishik (1985: 64-7) and Robson (1990). 
24
 Perhaps the best example of this is provided by MacKinnon (1987) where she presents her views on life 
and law in a series of speeches. 
feminists@law Vol 3, No 2 (2013) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13 
 
the knowledge claims it makes about law nor the rules it sets for its engagement with 
law can be severed from women’s telling of their experiences of the discrimination, 
disempowerment or oppression suffered at the hands of law on account of their sex. 
Moreover, it is a language from within whose utterances a new way of  knowing and 
thinking the law unfolds, one in which the epistemological primacy of speaking and 
hearing replaces the traditional emphasis on a clear division between the knower and 
known. 
 
In valorising the identity of the speaker rather than the language and text of law (those 
well-established loci of mainstream jurisprudence), feminist jurisprudence not only 
claims possession of its own distinct way of knowing the law, but also posits the 
language and mind of law as the primary objects of its critical scrutiny.
25
 Here a 
corporeal and situated voice and knowledge is juxtaposed to law’s disembodied and 
defaced language and knowledge. Through its reliance upon knowledge thought and 
lived, knowledge rooted in the everyday life experiences of women, the language of 
feminist jurisprudence claims a vitality and plural materiality even though boasting a 
singularity of standpoint, ‘the Woman’s point of view’.26 In sharp contrast, the language 
of law, nurtured by the tradition of legal texts and wise men, lacks the vigorous 
immediacy and temporality of speech. Scripted as a language of the intellect, a language 
of books and thought, its prudence is exposed in the immanent rationality and coherence 
of its own tradition; in the antiquity of its doctrines and principles, the sophistication of 
its modes of reasoning and interpretation, the scientific clarity of the categories and 
terms it uses, and through the logicality of its practices. If logos links law’s life and 
mind - connecting law as speech and practice to law as thought and text - it is the sexed 
body that links feminist jurisprudence’s voice to its thought. And so, before any 
arguments are made, this ineluctable juxtaposition has already shaped the nature and 
force of the challenge feminist jurisprudence posits to law. 
 
The qualities of abstraction, objectivity and neutrality that are inexorably linked to 
modernity’s law and its justice are those that comprise the first line of attack. Such 
qualities, feminist jurisprudence claims, are but hollow aspirations of the legal language 
and empty promises of the modes of reasoning upon which it rests; for there is no un-
gendered reality and hence no un-situated legal standpoint. Law’s persistent negations 
of its association with specificity or partiality, together with its assertions of the 
universal validity of the justice of its judgements, are not only deeply gendered, but, of 
course, their gender is profoundly masculine. Confronted by the ‘common language’ 
born out of the practice of consciousness-raising and articulated in the mode of 
‘thinking as a woman’, these qualities are exposed for what they are; constituents of 
law’s power and authority, and of a power and authority which participates in the 
construction and presentation of reality, and hence of women’s reality, from the 
dominant, the male, point of view (MacKinnon 1982: 543, 1983: 636-8; West 1988: 65; 
Finley 1989: 886; Scales 1992: 25-6). Law’s language, concepts, principles, and method 
                                                 
25
 This concern with the question of what law is and its approach from the standpoint of the speaker is 
evident in a number of key papers of the time. See, for example, Finley (1988, 1989), Scales (1986), and, 
of course, MacKinnon (1983). 
26
 The voice has been associated more with the body, immediacy, etc.: see Arendt (1998: 181-8), Barthes 
(1985), and Cavarero (2005). See also MacKinnon (1987), the spirit of the introduction and, in particular, 
pp 1 and 16-17. 
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of reasoning and adjudicating are therefore together, but one manifestation, one idiom, 
through which the relationships of power and domination existing between men and 
women are established and communicated. And so, in representing the male gaze as 
universal and objective - in short, as a standpoint ‘of view-lessness’- law not only 
denies sexual inequality to be constitutive of social reality, but, perhaps most 
importantly, is able to present force as consent, authority as participation, hierarchy as 
paradigmatic order, and control as legitimacy, and thereby shield itself from critique 
(MacKinnon 1983: 636-9; Scales 1986: 1385; West 1988: 60; Finley 1989: 892-5).
27
  
    
What began as a juxtaposition of the vocal and corporeal with the law’s language and 
mind thus becomes a root and branch attack on law’s claims to truth. For in unmasking 
what hitherto had been received as the natural and undisputable disposition of liberal 
law as a patriarchal fallacy, namely its commitment to equality, fairness and justice for 
all, feminist jurisprudence confronts law as an order of truth. Yet what makes this 
confrontation possible is not a persuasion grounded upon direct references to the social 
or legal reality of women. It is feminist jurisprudence’s sophisticated epistemology; an 
epistemology that has passed into the literature as ‘standpoint epistemology’, though 
which is perhaps more accurately encapsulated by Cavarero’s (2005: 14) expression 
‘the vocal phenomenology of uniqueness’.28 It is this phenomenology that authorised 
feminist jurisprudence to posit itself as an interlocutor of equal status with law, enabled 
it to avoid simply chastising law for the ills it causes women to suffer, and allowed it to 
challenge law’s hitherto unquestioned privileged and singular truth by positing its own, 
alternative one. 
 
 
b) Feminist jurisprudence and law as techné  
 
….I think it would be a good think for women to create a social order in which 
they can make use of their subjectivity with its symbols, images, its dreams and 
realities…. 
Irigaray (1993: 91)  
 
 
Technocratic legal knowledge disqualifies the lifeworld knowledge students 
bring with them to the law school…. 
Thornton (1998: 382) 
 
                                                 
27
 In fact, Mackinnon (1983: 638) calls this reason of male dominance ‘metaphysically near perfect’. 
28
 For Cavarero, narration that takes place in ‘consciousness-raising groups’ allows the self to be 
constitutively exposed to the other, something she identifies as a political exposure. What is central in 
such narrations is not the question of ‘What a Woman is’, which can only lead to abstract and universal 
definitions, but rather ‘Who speaks’, which valorises plurality and relationality. Cavarero, following 
Arendt, argues that understanding the notions of person/subject in the abstract through subsuming them in 
the already philosophically established linguistic categories, is not the only way. Instead, she valorises an 
understanding of the person as a unique, particular existent that can only be revealed through the narration 
of that person’s life story. It is in this context that voice becomes a significant element of personalisation 
as she seeks to understand narration from the perspective of the voice she conceives of as always 
embodied, rather than the language. For further discussion, see the excellent introductions by Kottman in 
Cavarero (2000, 2005). 
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The individual approaches discussed in this section, although not together comprising a 
coherent body of thought, do share a common attitude in their stance in respect to law; 
one which conforms to the criteria I set at the outset, those of positionality and 
reflexivity. It is this commonality which justifies my discussion of these approaches 
under a single unifying theme, a distinct trope of ‘feminist jurisprudence’. Distancing 
itself from an understanding of law as an order of truth, this feminist jurisprudence 
refuses to articulate wide theoretical knowledge propositions concerning the nature of 
law, its power and claims, and instead posits law as the object of its inquiry. Its first 
distinguishing characteristic is therefore of a Cartesian disposition; the sharp distinction 
between inquirer and the object of her inquiry, with the feminist scholar as subject of 
the jurisprudential inquiry, and law as its object. Feminist jurisprudence of this trope 
does not enter into dialogue with law, caring not for ‘who speaks’ or ‘from where’. 
Resting, as it does, upon the theoretical priority of the subject, it sets aside 
epistemological questions concerning the validity of voice, embodiment and personal 
narration, and instead privileges the thinking and observing qualities of the subject as 
the grounds upon which her ability to investigate established bodies of knowledge rests. 
 
What attracts these feminist scholars’ attention, what fuels their interest in law and 
gives rise to their relationship with it as one of inquiring subject and object of inquiry, is 
an understanding of law as a generative order; an order that produces understandings of 
empirical women. The presentation or, to be more accurate, re-presentation of women in 
law does precisely this; bringing into being and communicating a certain knowledge 
about them. And whether the locus of such knowledge is identified with the operation of 
legal discourse, with law’s performativity, or with the effects of law’s symbolic 
function, what is invariably at stake, what the feminist scholar contends with, are the 
projections of womanhood sustained by the legal language and text. Because the 
presentation of women in law is always a form of re-presentation, and therefore always 
involves a semblance of womanhood, the knowledge thereby produced can be no more 
than accomplishments of law’s creative imaginings as to what women are.29 It is this 
acknowledgement of law’s imagic power, which, in endowing law with imagination and 
creativity, makes it possible to think of feminist jurisprudence, even if unwittingly, as 
positioning itself towards law as techné.
30
 
 
The idea of law as techné, as ‘craft’ or ‘art’, is in no way new, and is certainly not alien 
to feminist legal scholarship.
31
 The long history of jurisprudence is replete with 
references to the art of legislation or that of judgment. The realist movement in the 
United States, for example, adopted this notion of law as one of the key features 
                                                 
29
 There are sporadic references to this kind of creativity of law. See, for example, Schultz (1992: 322-4) 
and Deutscher (2000: 72-3). 
30
 The word techné is a transliteration of a Greek term originally meaning skill and the correct method of 
producing a thing, and etymologically linked to the verb tekto, which means to bring to life, to produce, 
create, to cause something to happen. 
31
 In ancient Greece the notion of techné was closely linked to that of wisdom, at least up until Plato 
(Angier 2010: 5). In Hellenistic philosophy, especially the Stoics, techné was associated with philosophy 
and the art of living (Sellars 2003: 68-75). For a discussion of techné in ancient Greek literature, see 
Angier (2010: 1-12). For a discussion of law as ‘craft’, see Scharffs (2001). For a feminist discussion of 
the ‘art and craft of writing judgments’, see Rackley (2010: 44-56).   
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distinguishing it from legal positivism; with techné here being interpreted in the sense 
of ‘craft’ (Llewellyn 1960: 213-35). Constitutive of the definition of techné is an 
association with a particular type of achievement; a particular telos to be realised. In 
fact the essence of a techné lies precisely in the uniqueness of this telos in that only a 
specific set of expertise can enable it to be reached. A singularity of goal therefore 
distinguishes one techné from another; with each requiring its own technéte, the 
individual who possesses the skills necessary for achieving the goal. So the success of 
each depends on the technéte’s clear and systematic acquisition of the requisite 
knowledge, together with its accurate application. Aristotle (1994: 1140.9-10) defined 
techné as “….the trained ability of making something under the guidance of rational 
thought”, whilst Llewellyn (1960: 221) described it as “….the existence of some 
significant body of working knowhow…in some material degree transmissible and 
transmitted to the incomer”. Thus a fundamental property of techné is its being founded 
upon the stock of knowledge the technéte possesses, controls, and is able to effectively 
impart. That which belongs both to techné and law therefore is not merely the element 
of creativity: the fact that just as techné is closely linked to the notion of the artifice and 
the human power of creation, so too is law. The relationship of a technéte with her 
techné, is also akin to that of the jurist with law, being similarly marked by the rational 
understanding of a specific body of knowledge capable of transmission coupled with the 
mastery and control over the articulation and application of this knowledge. Both these 
elements, the recognition of law’s creativity as a knowledge producing order and the 
scholar as possessor of the necessary expertise to engage with law, mark the approach to 
law taken by this feminist jurisprudence. 
 
The feminist urge to interrogate law’s creativity stems primarily from the identification 
of this creativity with law’s re-presentational power, and the association of this in turn 
with law’s normative domain. In short, it is the persuasion that law, in re-presenting 
women through its norms, also advances knowledge about them. Yet the 
representational function of the legal norm is not only a significant formative parameter 
in regards to knowledge about women, it also channels the female self to come to know 
her identity in terms of sameness and difference, and self and other. As such the 
normative knowledge about women law entails is of crucial importance for the self-
apprehension of women as autonomous subjects instead of as the ‘other’ of man. The 
task the legal scholar sets herself however is not merely, nor even primarily, that of 
assaying degrees of resemblance between law’s re-presentation of women and that 
which it represents; in short, the re-presentation’s verisimilitude. Hence, the concern 
with the legal norm feminist jurisprudence exhibits does not manifest a wish to 
promulgate a politics of legal change aimed at instituting norms defining female identity 
and subjectivity in a more faithful way. Inherent in the idea of the legal norm is a sense 
of ‘normalisation’ conferring a quality of objectivity upon communicated norms and, in 
so doing, fixing the definitive contours of female identity. Replacing one set of legal 
norms with another simply substitutes one kind of fixity for another, whilst such local 
pressures leave the imagic power of law fully intact. It is precisely this power that this 
strand of feminist jurisprudence seeks to confront (Irigaray 1987: 72, 1987a: 1). 
 
Broadly speaking two jurisprudential modalities can be identified here. The first offers 
an analysis of the significant political effects law’s power has, in particular with 
reference to female subjectivity. More specifically, law’s imaginings about women as 
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manifested in the legal norm are seen as something akin to the symptoms of a ‘disease’, 
the legal system’s continuing commitment to a singular universal and male subject only. 
Law’s persistent refusal to acknowledge the significance of sexual difference and thus 
the exclusion of the feminine from its body, language and mind, cannot be remedied by 
a programme of normative reform. However innovative this change may be it cannot 
‘cure’ the absence of women as distinct subjects from law’s imaginings simply by 
transforming it into a presence. This can only occur through a comprehensive project of 
‘symbolic change’ (Irigaray 1994).  
 
Yet such a change can never be rooted in a narrative of women’s experience, in the ‘true 
stories of women’s lives’.32 It can only be accommodated by the displacement of 
gender, with sexual difference taking its place. And whether this displacement is 
associated with changes in law’s performative function, such as those proposed by 
Cornell’s ‘ethical feminism’, or with conceptions of the institution of law as part of the 
symbolic order - to thereby offer changes targeting law’s imagic power - in both 
instances, feminist jurisprudence purports to open up a space for the respect and 
protection of women as sexed beings (Cornell 1993a: 140-6; Irigaray 1993). So against 
the conventional imaginings of law are juxtaposed feminist imaginings; imaginings 
which envisage a distinctively female identity grounded upon the notion of sexual 
difference. These are imaginings most usually presented as formulations of a woman’s 
right to be represented as a sexuate being. Thus equal rights are replaced with 
equivalent rights, whilst other rights acknowledging sexual difference as irreducible, 
such as the right to virginity, motherhood and guardianship of the home, are demanded 
(Irigaray 1993, 1994; Cornell 1992: 235-7, 1998).
33
 
 
Although my discussion of this jurisprudential modality primarily refers to the work of 
Irigaray and Cornell, theirs are by no means the only examples. Yet, their work has been 
of fundamental significance to the development of this area. It has influenced many 
legal scholars who, like they, have offered their own feminist re-imaginations of the 
female subject before the law and have posited sexual difference as not only a structural 
element of the legal system, but also as the one, single indispensable condition for the 
recognition of Woman as a fully human subject, as a subject in Her own right.
34
 
 
The second jurisprudential modality, ‘discourse analysis’, is of a more pragmatic 
nature.
35
 It concentrates its efforts on understanding the workings of law, its practices, 
techniques and technologies, and seeks to delineate the manner in which legal norms 
authorise gendered representations of womanhood. Here law becomes a terrain of 
clearly formulated statements and practices that both systematically create the objects of 
which they speak and constitute the subject positions from which these statements are 
made. Moreover, these are not objects that are empirically apprehended. They are seen 
as inventions by law that can be classified, constructed and identified according to 
                                                 
32
 The significance of a women’s narrative for addressing women’s exclusion from law has been 
forcefully supported in the work of Robin West (1988). See also Cornell’s critique of West (1993).  
33
 For discussion of the parallels drawn between the work of Irigaray and Cornell, see Schwab 
(1996), Deutscher (2000) and Grosz (2008). 
34
 See for example Porter (2000) and the papers in Heberle and Pryor (2008). See also the collection of 
papers published by the Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective (1990), especially pp 60-80.   
35
 For a comprehensive discussion of discourse analysis, see Goodrich (1987). 
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specific discursive statements and practices. In a similar fashion, the discursive subject 
positions under scrutiny do not reference natural persons, for example, real women, but 
describe representations of womanhood that are effected by the enunciations and 
practices constitutive of the discursive field. 
 
The primary concern of discourse analysis is to illuminate the rules and processes by 
which law utilises specific rationalities, establishes its ‘truths’ and constitutes subject 
positions in the interiority of law. In so doing, it seeks to reveal how these rules and 
processes produce ‘outsiders’, whether these are forms of reasoning denounced as alien 
to its mind, ‘truths’ deemed alien to its language, or subjects silenced or otherwise made 
invisible before law’s eyes. This particular jurisprudential modality thus locates the 
exercise of law’s ‘creative’ power in the function and effects of the impersonal rules 
operating in the formation and regulation of the discourse. It offers an analysis that 
produces an anatomy of law’s prudence, which allows the feminist scholar as an expert 
of law possessing the unique traits required to read, interpret and understand legal 
practices, to confidently assert law’s representation of female subjectivity as neither 
natural nor transparent, but as merely one of law’s imaginings. What this jurisprudential 
modality targets therefore is law’s ability to proclaim what constitutes true or false 
knowledge about women; in other words, the very production of legal knowledge 
(Smart 1991; Chunn and Lacombe 2000: 7-12; Lacey 2002: 123-8; Gottel 2007; 
Fineman 2011; Mullally 2011).  
 
 
IV. Conclusion or the prudence of law and the prudence of feminism.  
  
…the refusal to accept the closed terrains of conventional thought is an anti-
conservative step which hopefully, in the right contexts, can open the domain of 
law to potentially unthinkable possibilities. 
Davies (1996:17) 
  
In re-introducing the long-forgotten question of feminist jurisprudence in the manner I 
have I am aware that I am opening myself to criticism. Not only has feminist legal 
scholarship disowned and disavowed previous feminist engagements with 
jurisprudence, but the taxonomy I offer here might be seen as rather arbitrary. Indeed, 
neither of the feminist strands I identify as approaching law as techné would likely 
acknowledge themselves as jurisprudential modes. Indeed, this may be the case. Yet I 
would nevertheless maintain that casting the net of jurisprudence more widely across 
legal scholarship allows us to recapture and reassess the question of feminist 
jurisprudence. This is not to suggest that I employ the concept merely to finesse this 
‘trick’. For the term ‘jurisprudence’ is more than merely a descriptive one. It also bears 
normative gravity; a gravity which has both shaped the fortunes of jurisprudence within 
feminist legal scholarship and fuelled my own desire to re-visit the topic as a potentially 
valuable, if not essential, activity for us to pursue. 
 
The very label ‘jurisprudence’, as utilised formally in that work that does unequivocally 
identify itself as feminist jurisprudence, which MacKinnon’s writings most famously 
epitomise, has received a particularly ‘bad press’ within feminism. Critics have roundly 
attacked and comprehensively dismissed feminist jurisprudence primarily on two 
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grounds.
36
 The first is that it adopts an essentialist understanding of womanhood, and 
the second, which is of greatest interest in the context of this paper, is that it mimics the 
conventional form of jurisprudence existing in our times, that of positivism. Any desire 
to engage with law’s jurisprudential traditions is portrayed as inevitably succumbing to 
the temptation to reproduce the very jurisprudence it challenges (Smart 1989: 66-9). In 
aspiring to advance a general theory of law, feminist jurisprudence was castigated for 
mirroring the positivist mainstream by valorising an understanding of law as a coherent 
and rational body of knowledge resting upon a priori principles and as a distinct field of 
practice operating at some distance from society (Smart 1989: 66-9). Furthermore, 
critics warning against a feminist jurisprudence argue that those who embark on this 
venture, even if perhaps unintentionally, necessarily attribute undue significance to law; 
indeed, even fetishise it. 
 
What seems to be at the heart of such critiques is the entirely distinct, largely 
alternative, conception of law, held by the critic. Thus, although jurisprudents and 
critics alike both speak of law, this, their common object of thought, is not thought of in 
the same terms. For those who repudiate a jurisprudential approach, law does not 
comprise a uniform and monolithic body of knowledge bearing a singular ideology, be 
it male, patriarchal, or sexist. They argue that to confront law in this way obfuscates 
law’s ‘natural condition’, which often is to behave in an incoherent, fragmented and at 
times contradictory manner, and that this effectively tears it away from its ‘natural 
environment’, that is, its social context (Smart 1989: 163-5; Roach-Anleu 1992: 432-
4).
37
 Thus in opposition to the pursuit of what it describes as a ‘false quest’, which 
thinks of law only in its own terms, thereby transforming the feminist intervention into 
an exclusively legal debate, these critics pose an analysis connecting law to the social 
structure; often supporting their position with empirical investigation; what we can term 
a ‘law and society’ approach (Smart 1989: 67).38 
 
It is to this dissonance that I wish to draw attention because its very presence caused me 
to think anew about feminist jurisprudence and the unwavering reproach that it has 
attracted. More specifically, it was the critics’ reference to its unintended alliance to 
mainstream jurisprudence that led me to consider the debate in terms of the traditions 
represented by the interlocutors’ arguments rather than the correctness or the persuasion 
of the substance of these arguments. Both the legal scholars and their critics belong to 
and speak from traditions of thought that conceive of law in their own distinctive ways 
and therefore each asks a different set of questions. Yet, although in their exchanges 
each speaks from a different position, the question of tradition does not enter the debate.  
 
In unequivocally distinguishing itself from the jurisprudential approach to law, the ‘law 
and society’ approach overlooks its own alliance to the nineteenth century rise of 
positivism. Putting its trust in an epistemology grounded in principles derived from 
rational thinking and empirically verifiable data, positivism introduced a novel way of 
                                                 
36
 See, for example, the critiques of MacKinnon in Smart (1989: 76-82) and Cornell (1993: 96-111). 
37
 This is not to suggest that Smart subscribes to this approach. I simply want to point out that her critical 
arguments directed at feminist jurisprudence can be seen as part of this approach.  
38
 For further discussion of the value of empirical work in feminist encounters with law, see Currie (1992: 
82-6). 
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understanding law. In asserting the empirical as the locus of truth, it elevated reality as a 
key measure of this truth such that the validity and utility of social institutions, 
including law, could only be thought of and evaluated in their social context and in 
relation to the functions they performed. Here, law, though still posited as distinct from 
society, was recognised as existing in a constant dynamic interaction with it; the result 
being that this association of law with the positivistic canon served to privilege 
women’s empirical reality as the yardstick by which to judge the law and lead the 
feminist politics of legal reform to become the dominant form of feminist engagement 
with law it remains to this day.
39
  
 
In critically juxtaposing the presence of law as a distinct body of knowledge and 
practice to law in its social context, the critics of feminist jurisprudence too easily 
dismissed what now has passed into our history as a short-lived feminist experiment. 
Most importantly, they thwarted a concerted feminist engagement with the long 
standing tradition committed to the study of law’s prudence.40 What their criticism 
failed to pay attention to was that law in the western tradition is, and has long been, both 
a distinct practice and a body of knowledge; in fact a distinct tradition in itself. It is in 
this tradition, understood in terms of the particular styles, models, patterns and theories, 
that have shaped and sustained it, that law’s power to oppress, privilege, exclude or 
include, inheres. And therefore, it is only through close examination of this tradition 
that the power of law to image the world can be laid bare.
41
  
 
Clearly, a critical interrogation of law’s prudence does not necessarily have to lead to a 
reconciliation with or reproduction of that prudence. It certainly does not mean an 
uncritical, blind acceptance of the limits law puts on its subject matter. Rather, it can be 
seen as an invitation to transgress these limits by setting against the prudence of law, 
that of the feminist jurist. Indeed, whether addressing law’s prudence face to face, as the 
first trope does, or positing law as the object of its thought, as does the second trope, 
feminist jurisprudence in all its guises has already accepted this invitation. Thus the first 
trope, by privileging the question of ‘who speaks’, allies its critique and politics of law 
to an embodied ontology based on the method of consciousness-raising and, through 
this material relationship, challenges the prudence of law, revealing it to be nothing 
more than a male metaphysics. Similarly, of the two jurisprudential modalities under the 
second trope, one reveals law’s philosophical and juridical traditions to be structured by 
the exclusion of the feminine, whilst the other exposes law’s practices and techniques to 
function as technologies of gender.
42
 
 
                                                 
39
 For a discussion of the rise of different schools of positivism in the nineteenth century, see Giddens 
(1979: 237-59). For an analysis of the relation of positivism to a feminist politics of legal reform, see 
Drakopoulou (2008: 344-7). 
40
 This is not to suggest that feminist jurisprudence, in whatever guise, has no concern for the social. I 
simply want to emphasise that the social is not constitutive of their analysis of law. 
41
 For an exposition of different ways in which feminist legal scholarship can engage with the legal 
tradition, see the papers in the collection by Drakopoulou (2013a). 
42
 In relation to the first trope, see for example the analysis of law in Irigaray (1987, 1994). For a classic 
discussion of the notions of technology and technology of gender, see Foucault (1988) and de Lauretis 
(1987). See also the analysis of law as a gendering practice in Sheldon (1993) and Smart (1995). 
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Whatever the substantive and specific merits of each of these feminist encounters with 
jurisprudence, my contention is that they all have come into being as responses to 
specific theoretical and practical questions facing feminist legal scholarship. All have 
been formulated through critical reflection on law’s continuing resistance to any change 
in its conduct towards women despite feminism’s persistent analysis of its norms and 
suggestions for their reform. In short, they all distinguish themselves from the ‘women 
and law’ approach aimed at inserting or repositioning women within a space already 
delimited by law.
43
 Similarly, in a self-reflexive manner, in their meeting with law’s 
prudence they all acknowledge the traditions they ally themselves to. And whether they 
see it located in the words of law, in the entirety of its body, or in law’s practices and 
techniques, they all, when setting off on their explorations of law’s imagic power, 
dream of the birth of novel feminist jurisprudential traditions founding a different law 
and justice for living together (MacKinnon 1983: 640, 1987: 1-17, 215-28; Smart 1990, 
1995; Irigaray 1996: 52-3; Cornell 1998: 174-86, 1999).  
 
In reframing the question of ‘women and law’ as one of the law’s imagic power and 
‘our living together’, as a question lying at the intersection of the juridical and the 
political, these jurisprudential approaches may be better conceived of as meditations on 
theoretical and practical concerns with law rather than expositions of feminist legal 
theory.
44
 It is this double nexus of the theoretical and practical marking this body of 
work, which justifies their recognition as articulations of a feminist prudence and 
confers upon them the label of ‘jurisprudence’.45  
 
What I hope to have achieved with this paper is to bring to light what was latent in 
feminist legal scholarship and ask for it to be openly acknowledged. Feminist 
jurisprudence has undoubtedly initiated the most audacious projects we have attempted 
hitherto. In reflecting upon its aspirations rather than its faults, we feminist legal 
scholars should stop shying away from it and indeed dare to rehabilitate it. It is my 
contention that it is only when we boldly assert our commitment to such a project that 
we will be able to address the power that inhabits the prudence of law. And even if in 
challenging this we admit it to be nothing more than that of an invented tradition, our 
working both ‘with’ and against this tradition will enable us to think afresh about our 
positionality towards law, the questions we ask of law, and. in so doing, to invent and 
institute our own, alternative, feminist traditions.
46
  
                                                 
43
 This approach, which posits the empirical woman and her experience as the yardstick against which 
feminist demands and critiques of law are to be measured, is intimately linked to the ‘law and society’ 
tradition and therefore was also made possible by the nineteenth-century epistemological prevalence of 
positivism. For a discussion of the rise of this approach in the nineteenth century, see Drakopoulou 
(2008). 
44
 The etymology of the word theory, from the Greek theoria, designates a contemplative enterprise and 
as such is usually thought of in ‘passive’ terms, bereft of pragmatic concerns involving judgements about 
a course of action. Within feminist scholarship the term ‘theory’, though widely used, has rarely been the 
object of inquiry or debate. One exception is Bottomley (2000).   
45
 Throughout its history the intellectual virtue of prudence has been associated with its Aristotelian 
definition as practical wisdom similar to the knowledge and skill required by techné in that they both 
utilise knowledge to determine and guide action (Aristotle 1994: 1140). For a discussion of the notion of 
prudence in the Renaissance, see Khan (1985: 19-54), and for one that associates prudence and legal 
interpretation, see Gadamer (2004: 306-19). 
46
 For a discussion of the sort of questions we might wish to ask of law as feminist jurisprudents, see 
Genovese (2013). 
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